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COMMENTS
HOME OWNERSHIP IN SPACE - PIE IN THE SKY?
By JOSEPH S. GENSHLEA* and WILLIAM A. HmST*
HOLMES said, "a word is but the skin of a living thought." In the
case of "condominium" there would appear to be but one "skin" for
at least two thoughts. The term may be roughly translated from its
Latin root as meaning "control together;"' but its original legal effect
was a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common. The term has recently
been rejuvenated to apply to ownership of a portion of space around
which is an apartment,2 coupled with another interest, as tenant in com-
mon, of the common areas. Since it appears that the two ideas, as legal
concepts, are not synonymous, one wonders whether a more appropriate
"skin" could not have been discovered. Thus, to attribute the deriva-
tion of "condominium" to ancient Rome without first re-defining it
in its modem sense would appear, at first blush, to be misleading. On
the other hand, perhaps the modern condominium is fundamentally
little more than a tenancy in common' in the common areas coupled
with some irrevocable right to occupy the space enclosed by the walls
of an apartment?
The proposed California condominium legislation, according to
its chief draftsman, "defines a new estate in real property, called a
'condominium'. . . ., But it is not clear how the incidents of this
"new estate" will differ from the incidents of more familiar property
interests. Is there a "new estate," or merely a combination of estates
or property interests which have been known to the common law for
centuries?
The expressed purpose of the condominium builders is to give more
urban dwellers the benefits of "home ownership." This is said to be
* Members, Second Year class.
'BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
2 Comment, 50 CALIF. L Rlv. 299, 302 (1962) ; Borgwardt, The Condominium, 36 CAL.
S. BAR J. 603, 604 (1961); Panel Discussion: How we closed the sale on our first Con-
dominium, CONDOMINIUM CONFERENCE.
'Woods v. Petchell et al., 175 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1949). In an action to enjoin the
owner of an apartment house from conveying fee simple title to the individual units of the
building, the court said, in construing the property interest, that the unit owners were only
tenants in common.
'Gregory, The California Condominium Bill, 14 HASTINGs L.J. - (1963).
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accomplished by conveying a real property interest in a unit of a
condominium which will have the stability, insurability and market-
ability of a fee simple in land. This interest is to be coupled with
another interest which is that of a tenant in common in the common
areas of the condominium. But what is meant by the term "home
ownership?" "Ownership" is a rather imprecise legal term. Does
not a mere lessee "own" his property interests under the lease? Also,
most home owners have legal title in fee to a parcel of land upon
which there is placed an "improvement" which becomes an accession
to the land. When the title to the land is held by more than one per-
son it is, commonly at least, shared by members of the same family.
This article purports to raise such fundamental questions as: what
is the nature of "home ownership" in a condominium? To what does
one have title? How enduring is that property interest? When the
building is destroyed, or is no longer habitable, what remains to the
"homeowner?" Is there any reason to believe that he will have anything
more substantial than a tenancy in common such as was envisaged by
the homeowner of ancient Rome?
Ownership of Space
Putting the condominium into effect depends fundamentally on
the possibility of "owning" space. In this regard there was a wide gulf
between the Anglo-American common law and the Roman law. Neither
the Romans nor the English ever recognized ownership in air itself.5
To the Romans "aer" as well as water was "jus naturales", to be
enjoyed in common by all.6 Occupancy or use was protected, but no
right whatever was acquired; and, when ended, that which was used
or occupied reverted immediately to the common enjoyment.7
Although several writers have doubted its origin, the long rec-
ognized, much cited and recently controversial "ad coelum" maxims
indicates that the Romans were aware of a distinction between air and
5
BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 107 (2nd ed. 1957).
"And indeed, by the jus naturales these things belong to all men-the air ....
Institutes 2.11 pr.
BUCKLAND, op. cit. supra note 5.
"Cujus est selem ejus est usque ad coelum . . . et ad inferos" (added later, apparently
by analogy). "To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also the sky . . . and to the
depths." The maxim does not occur in the Roman texts although it is found in the writings
of the Glossists. McNAlr, LAW OF THE AIR, 2 (1953). Baldwin, Law of the Airship, 4 Am. J.
INT'L L. 95 (1904), says the maxim is foreign to the Roman conception of what is the
common property of all. See also, Wandsworth v. Telephone Co., L.R., 13 Q.B.D. 904 (1884).
But, in support or at least recognition of the maxim see, COKE ON LITTLETON 4a; 2 BLACK-
STONE COMMENTARIES 401. GOUDY, Two Ancient Brocards, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY,
thinks the maxim entirely consistent with the Roman law.
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the space occupied by air.9 But while the Romans apparently allowed
ownership of space, their law "totally excluded super-imposed free-
holds."' ° Any right in a horizontal stratum was regarded as a servitude
upon the fee." To express this arose the phrase, "super ficies solo
cedit";12 that is, whatever is attached to the land forms part of it.
Here then lies a great difference between the two systems, for split
ownership of realty has long been recognized in Anglo-American law.'"
The problem seems to be whether space is to be considered an aspect
of realty capable of seisin or merely an appurtenance to the land.
There is considerable uncertainty concerning ownership of space
above land.' 4 Probably the first significant doubt was expressed by
Lord Ellenborough in Pickering v. Rudd: 5 "I do not think it is a tres-
pass to interfere with the column of air superincumbent upon the
close. . . . [I]t would follow that an aeronaut is liable to an action
quare clausum fregit at the suit of the occupier of every field over which
his balloon passes."' 6
On the other hand, some cases have come out strongly in favor
of ownership of space'" and a few have appeared to allow stratifica-
tion of space into freeholds.'" The courts seem to recognize ownership
of space above land when to do so does not offend their sense of logic
or justice.' 9 Thus, "this formula [referring to "cujus est solem ejus
The distinction between "aer" and "ad coehum" is recognized by HAZELTINE, LAW
OF THE AIR (1911), and Zollman, Air Space Rights, 53 Am. L REv. 711 (1919).
"BUCKLAND AND McNAI, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 101 (2d ed. 1951).
"HAELTINE, supra note 9, at 74.
"Gains 2, 73.
Division of buildings for purposes of ownership: Cheeseborough v. Green, 10 Conn.
318 (1834) ; McConnel v. Kibbe, 33 I1. 175 (1864) ; Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass. 575 (1808) ;
Doe d. Freeland v. Burt, 1 T. R. 701, 99 Eng. Rep. 1330 (1787); COKE ON LiTTLEToN 48b.
The mineral bearing part of land may be separated by (a) selling the minerals, Chester
Emery Co. v. Lucas, 112 Mass. 424 (1873) ; Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. 475, 72 Am. Dec. 760
(1858), (b) selling the land with the exception of the minerals, Marvin v. Brewster Iron
Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 538, 14 Am. Rep. 322 (1874); Sloan v. Lawrence Furnace Co., 29
Ohio St. 568 (1876).
"TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 583, at 503 (3d ed. 1939).
x 4 Camp. 219 (1815).
'oPROSSER, TORTS § 60 (2d ed. 1955), notes four theories to cope with the airplane
problem.
"7 Butler v. Frontier Telegraph Co., 109 App. Div. 217 (N.Y., 1905), "The law regards
the empty space as though it was a solid, inseparable from the soil."; Fay v. Prentice,
1 C.B. 828, 135 Eng. Rep. 769 (1845) ; Baten's Case, 9 Coke 53b (1599?).
"Pearson v. Matheson, 102 S.C. 377, 86 S.E. 1063 (1915), noted in 29 HARv. L. Rlv.
525; Taft v. Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 127 Wash. 503, 221 Pac. 604 (1923).
19 Ball, The Jural Nature of Land, 23 ILL. L. REv. 45, 51 (1928), says the maxim was
a rule of construction and gave rise to certain rebuttable presumptions. ZOLLMAN, supra
note 9, at 722, says it was first a rule of construction to, inter alia, insure the owner the use
of his land against encroachments so far up or down as he might care to go.
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est usque ad coelum. . . . et ad inferos"] was never taken literally,
but was a figurative phrase to express the full and complete owner-
ship of land."2 [Emphasis added.]
Since the term "ad inferos" was added to the maxim by analogy,
and since stratification of areas below the surface is universally
allowed, there seems to be no logical reason why space may not be
divided horizontally into freeholds.21 The courts have not seen fit to
draw the analogy, however, probably because of the incorporeal nature
of space.22
The situation in California with respect to ownership of space is
confused. One statute states: "Land is the solid material of the earth,
whatever may be the ingredients of which it is composed, whether soil,
rock or other substance."2 Another says: "The owner of land in fee
has the right to the surface and everything permanently situated beneath
and above it."2
One writer has concluded that, taken together, these two statutes
preclude ownership of space,25 and the cases appear to support this
interpretation.28 Most of these cases deal with encroachments upon
the space above the land but which do not touch it. The only remedy
afforded has been by way of injunction in an action of nuisance based
on a finding that the landowner had used his land in such an unreason-
able way as to interfere with another's use and enjoyment of his land.T
Since it is clear that such interference may take place without touching
the surface of any land at all, and since the only property interest
required of the plaintiff is his ownership of the land, there can be no
ownership in space reasonably implied from these decisions. Thus,
20 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
300 U.S. 654 (1937).
2 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 16. Horizontal Divisions of Land, 1 Am. L. REG. 577,
578, as of 1862: "no case has been discovered where an effort actually had been made
to create by conveyance a freehold in space separate from the land . . . as is universally
possible in herbage or mineral strata."
22 Note, 29 HARv. L. REV. 525 (1916); Ball, Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land,
76 U. PA. L. REv. 631 (1928).
22 CAL. CIV. CODE § 659.
24 CAL. CIV. CODE § 829.
20 Ball, supra note 22.
20 Kafka v. Bozio, 191 Cal. 746, 218 Pac. 753 (1923) (overhanging wall) ; Grandona v.
Lovdal, 78 Cal. 611, 21 Pac. 366 (1889) (branches extending over plaintiff's land) ; Meyer v.
Metzler, 51 Cal. 142 (1875) (a brick wall leaning over plaintiff's land) ; Gillespie v. Jones,
47 Cal. 259 (1874) (projection over land of adverse possessor held not to stop running of
Statute of Limitations).
2" This as opposed to trespass and ejectment. Both protect the interest in exclusive
possession. Thus, in a case of encroachment above the surface without touching the surface,
in which the remedy provided by either trespass or ejectment is granted, the court necessarily
recognizes an interest in space above the land.
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while cases do not say that there cannot be ownership of space, neither
do they say that there can be such a thing.
The two statutes quoted above were discussed in Hinman v. Pacific
Air Transport Co.,2" a federal case purporting to decide California law.
Title to the air space unconnected to the use of the land is incon-
ceivable. . . Without possession, no right in it can be maintained.
.. .The owner of the land owns as much of the space above him as
he uses, but only so long as he uses it. . . . It would be, and is,
utterly impractical and would lead to endless confusion if the law
should uphold attempts of landowners to stake out or assert claims
to definite, unused spaces in the air in order to protect some contem-
plated future use of it.
Prosser cites this as the "actual enjoyment" doctrine.2" It really
amounts to a denial of any title to space as we know it. It constitutes
merely a recognition of the Roman law, and common law, concept of
allowing a right of use or occupancy of air.
The California Aeronautics Code provides that the "owner" of the
surface "owns" the space above the land. 0 Can this be reconciled with
the holding in the Hinman case? Throughout this discussion the term
"ownership" has been used repeatedly. It is, of course essential to
define this word precisely, at least so far as the California law is con-
cerned. The Civil Code states that the "ownership of a thing is the
right to possess and use it to the exclusion of others. 3 This would
appear to be in complete accord with the spirit expressed in the Hinman
case, although capable of a broader construction. Thus, California
courts apparently permit ownership of space but completely deny any
continuity to such ownership. It is an interest that terminates auto-
matically upon cessation of use or occupancy.
Assuming for the moment that an interest in space may be created,
can a continuous interest in space be created? One case has been found.
In Hahn v. Bakers Lodge'2 plaintiff conveyed a second floor room to
defendant. Subsequently the second story burned leaving only remnants
of the walls which had once defined the room. The lower story remained.
Defendant wished to enter and rebuild. With respect to this the court
said:
What we are trying to indicate is that, by the terms of the interest,
it is the middle room or hall of the upper story which was granted
"8 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
300 U.S. 654 (1937).
" PossER, op. cit. supra note 16.
' CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21402.
31 CAL. CIv. CODE § 654.
Hahn v. Baker Lodge, 21 Ore. 30, 27 Pac. 166 (1891).
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to the defendant, and not a part of the building; that the defendant
did not acquire any right or ownership in the building, or any part
of it, but in the room or space enclosed by that part of the building
which was described and identified as the middle room or hall of the
upper story. This it owned; and so long as it existed, and its identity
was preserved, the defendant had the right to its enjoyment. But
when the fire destroyed the building, and the identity of the room and
its existence as such were extinguished and at an end, there was noth-
ing remaining upon which defendant's conveyance could operate, and
its rights at once terminated. [Emphasis added.]
Home Ownership in Space
For the sake of argument let us assume that in California a con-
tinuing interest in space can be conveyed apart from the land, for this
is provided for in the proposed condominium legislation. Needless to
say, formidable problems present themselves. For example, it is not
difficult to foresee "stubborn" space owners demanding exorbitant
prices from adjacent land or space owners for the privilege of rebuild-
ing after a condominium has been destroyed. It has been suggested
that the grantor of such an interest in space make it defeasible in order
to avoid such an eventuality.33 To be able to create such defeasible
estates, however, assumes the present existence of a fee simple absolute
in the grantor, and that being the case, encompasses also the potential
creation of estates for life, years, etc. To confine interests in space to
determinable fees is probably quite desirable, but this may well per-
plex a student of real property law. After all, if it determines as to
the unit owner it must revest in someone. The real estate presumably
still exists. But perhaps such an estate is by design intended to evapo-
rate? That would be a convenient solution to many problems which
might arise when the building is no longer habitable.
Ownership of space raises a related problem of "space specula-
tion"; namely, the buying up of parcels of space in the hope of profiting
by the trend toward "building up." With a relatively small amount of
capital such space, if it is intended to be an enduring property interest,
could be purchased over dwellings in depressed areas in anticipation
of future redevelopment. Such a prospect, because of its totally un-
acceptable implications, exposes the paradox in the idea of ownership
of real property estates in space. It comes down to the fact that there
can be, or there cannot be, ownership of space-depending upon
whether or not there exists a building which can enclose it. The build-
ing itself, which is owned as a tenancy in common, is the sine qua non
upon which the estate in space is predicated. This means that "owner-
33 Borgwardt, The Condominium, 36 CAL. S. BAR J. 605 (1961).
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ship of space," as a concept, imports something that is neither mysteri-
ous nor glamorous, i.e., a right of use and occupation for the time
being. That being so, it should easily be possible, as pending legislation
provides, to convey or transfer a unit owner's interest. But is the thing
which is being transferred anything other than an irrevocable license
(to lease for a period), or perhaps a right analogous to that of a tenant
in a cooperative apartment entitling him to lease a particular apartment
in a building because of his share ownership in the corporation which
owns the building? Such rights, it is obvious, have little resemblance to
those which an ordinary "home owner" envisions as his "real estate."
If these problems could be resolved others remain. Assuming a
decision to rebuild after the destruction of the condominium, could
the owners as a practical matter afford to rebuild? With typically
rising construction costs it is optimistic at best to suppose that any
reasonably priced insurance would cover the actual cost of rebuilding
(unless, of course, the condominium were destroyed immediately after
construction.) If the structure lasts for a relatively long period of
time the unit owners would probably still be limited if they decided to
rebuild; i.e., any new structure and its parts would have to conform,
with more or less exactness, to the parcels of space involved. This
may well necessitate the use of designs which may be functionally
and esthetically outmoded.
Conclusion
This article attempts to pose, and particularly for the sake of
argument, some questions which have to be answered in any analysis
of the concept of "home ownership" as applied to a unit in a con-
dominium. It is apparent that this concept involves more than a simple
fusion of boldly creative imagination and the existing body of law. How-
ever, a buyer of a condominium unit, it is submitted, may be getting
much less than he expects in the way of "home ownership" than another
who spends an equivalent amount of money for a conventional house
and lot. And if he should prefer to be an apartment dweller and if
he is pondering the advantages of condominium ownership, he should
first of all consider this statement by the draftsman of the pending
condominium legislation which appears in the lead article of this
issue:" "On the other hand, he has exclusive ownership of the space
within his unit. His rights therefore are substantially the same for
the duration of his estate as those of a typical lessee of an apartment
or of other building 'space' during his term of years." [Emphasis
added.]
U Gregory, The Caifornz Condominium Bifll, 14 HASTNGS L.J. - (1963).
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